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Abstract—Recently, there has been a growing concern
about the overload status of the power grid networks,
and the increasing possibility of cascading failures. Many
researchers have studied these networks to provide design
guidelines for more robust power grids. Topological analysis
is one of the components of system analysis for its robustness.
This paper presents a complex systems analysis of power
grid networks. First, the cascading effect has been simulated
on three well known networks: the IEEE 300 bus test
system, the IEEE 118 bus test system, and the WSCC 179
bus equivalent model. To extend the analysis to a larger set
of networks, we develop a network generator and generate
multiple graphs with characteristics similar to the IEEE
test networks but with different topologies. The generated
graphs are then compared to the test networks to show
the effect of topology in determining their robustness with
respect to cascading failures. The generated graphs turn
out to be more robust than the test graphs, showing the
importance of topology in the robust design of power grids.
The second part of this paper concerns the discussion of two
novel mitigation strategies for cascading failures: Targeted
Load Reduction and Islanding using Distributed Sources.
These new mitigation strategies are compared with the
Homogeneous Load Reduction strategy. Even though the
Homogeneous Load Reduction is simpler to implement,
the Targeted Load Reduction is much more effective.
Additionally, an algorithm is presented for the partitioning
of the network for islanding as an effort towards fault
isolation to prevent cascading failures. The results for island
formation are better if the sources are well distributed, else
the algorithm leads to the formation of superislands. *
Index Terms—Cascading Effect, Power Degradation,
Mitigation Strategies
I. INTRODUCTION
North American Electric Reliability Corporation
(NERC) defines a cascading failure as “The uncontrolled
loss of any system facilities or load, whether because of
thermal overload, voltage collapse, or loss of synchronism,
except those occurring as a result of fault isolation” [1].
In power grids flow dynamics depend greatly on the
electrical characteristics such as the voltages, impedances,
This work is supported by the Energy and Power Affiliates Program,
consisting of Westar Energy, Burns and McDonnell, Omaha Public Power
District, and Nebraska Public Power District.
*This paper is best viewed in colored format
and the difference in the angles of the voltage phasors
of a given pair of buses between which the transmission
line is present. If we assume that all the voltages are
constant at 1 p.u. and angle difference is very small,
we can say that the amount of power flowing through
the transmission lines is inversely proportional to their
impedances. If a single line gets overloaded or breaks,
its power is immediately re-routed to a different line and
the disturbance can be suspended. But sometimes, the
other line is also already overloaded and must re-route
its increased load to its neighbors. This redistribution of
power may lead to the subsequent overloading of other
lines causing their malfunction at the same time and the
consequence could be a cascade of overloading failures.
Such incidents have taken place in history, such as the
one on August 10, 1996 when a 1300 MW electrical line
in Southern Oregon sagged in summer heat, initiating a
chain reaction that cut power to more than four million
people in 11 Western States [2], [3]. Another example is
the incident of August 14, 2003 when an initial disturbance
in Ohio [4] led to the largest blackout in the history of the
United States and millions of people throughout parts of
North Eastern and Mid Western United States, and Ontario,
Canada, were without power for as long as 15 hours.
Electric power systems collapsed in Denmark, Italy, and
the United Kingdom within weeks or months of the U.S.
blackout [5].
Large-scale blackouts are due to the concurrent mal-
function of a number of transmission lines and power
generators often triggered by the initial failure of a single
component of the grid, such as the breakdown of a power
line [6]. This is discussed in [7] with the help of a hidden
failure model in which some components of the network
such as relays have defects that remain dormant until
abnormal operating conditions are reached. The authors
of [8] have shown that if a line L which shares a node
with other lines fails, the hidden failures in all the other
lines sharing the node are exposed.
Recently, many complex networks researchers have
shown an interest in the topological analysis of real
world networks, including power grids as seen in
[6], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14].
While use of advanced control technologies, communi-
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cation methods and power engineering are critical aspects
of providing robustness with respect to cascading failures
for power grid networks, a topological analysis is also
an important aspect. The power grid can be represented
by a large graph belonging to a special family of graphs
called complex networks. Power grid networks follow
an exponential degree distribution and although not very
heterogeneous in the node degree, they show a high hetero-
geneity in the node load. Most of the nodes handle a small
load but there are a few nodes that handle an extremely
high load [6]. The same is true for links also. Thus, some
nodes and links tend to become more important than others
and an intentional or accidental removal of these elements
can damage the network.
Initial studies by [15], [16], [17], [18] have focused on
the static properties of the network, without considering
their underlying flow dynamics and have shown that the
removal of a node or group of nodes can have important
undesirable consequences. Further studies considered flow
dynamics based on the efficiency model suggested in [19].
This model cannot be applied to a power grid directly, and
authors of [12] agree on this point. They have discussed the
problems associated with the general definition of vulner-
ability based on global efficiency of power grid networks,
as mentioned in [6], [10], and [20]. Some modifications
to the way in which efficiency is calculated might make
it more suitable for the power grid. The authors of [10]
have mentioned that in general, in complex networks, the
relevant quantity for the network travels between a set
of nodes using the shortest path, and that the load on a
node is the total number of shortest paths passing through
that node. They have then used this theory to evaluate
the robustness of complex networks to cascading failures.
Again, this theory cannot be applied directly to power grids
unless the concept of shortest paths is precisely defined for
power grids. Power does not follow shortest paths based
on network metrics such as number of hops.
In this paper, we present a thorough analysis on the
robustness of power grid networks with respect to cas-
cading failures, calculating flows in the networks using
the DC Power Flow Model [21]. Even if this model
is an approximated model where non-linearities are re-
moved, it has been shown to be adequate for our type
of analysis. For the purpose of simulating a cascading
failure, we developed a simulator and tested it on the
IEEE test networks available at [22]. We define Power
Degradation as a metric to quantify the load loss in power
grid networks, as a result of cascading failure, discussed
in Section II. We also generate networks with the same
number of nodes and links as the test networks but with
a different topology, using a variation of the Generalized
Random Graph model for this generation. Comparing the
Power Degradation of the different topologies, we show the
impact of the topology: among the considered topologies,
the best topology provides an improvement of robustness
equal to 36.79%. However, the purpose of this paper is not
to generate alternate realistic topologies for the power grid
networks, but simply to show that a change in topology
can change the robustness of the network to attacks and
failures. The provision of realistic guidelines for robust
power grid design will be considered in future work.
The second contribution of this paper concerns the
definition and testing of two novel mitigation strategies,
namely Targeted Load Reduction and Islanding using
Distributed Sources. We compare the efficiency of the
proposed strategies with respect to the Homogeneous
Reduction. Our analysis confirms the efficiency of the
Targeted Load Reduction, which reduces on average the
load shedding required to stop the cascading effects by x%
in total. On the other hand, the Islanding using Distributed
Sources is only efficient under some constraints on the
level of distribution of the generation. However, when
the constraints are met, this strategy can be realistically
implemented using small and renewable energy sources
such as wind turbines.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II describes
the approach proposed to simulate and analyze cascading
failures in a given power grid. In Section III this approach
is used to quantify and compare the impact of cascading
failures on the realistic IEEE power grids and the generated
graphs. Further, in Section IV, we suggest two mitigation
strategies for cascading failures, based on load reduction
and network disconnection, with the help of distributed
renewable sources. Results and conclusions, along with fu-
ture work are presented in Sections V and VI, respectively.
Further, in Section IV, we suggest three mitigation
strategies for cascading failures - Homogeneous load re-
duction, Targeted load reduction and Islanding with the
help of distributed renewable sources. Among the load
reduction strategies, Homogeneous strategy is very simple
to implement but Targeted strategy is much more efficient.
Islanding is implemented using a two step process to obtain
islands which would be powered by distributed energy
sources such as wind turbines.
II. SIMULATION OF CASCADING FAILURES
In this section, we present an approach to analyze the ro-
bustness of the power grid network based on the very well-
known DC Power Flow Model [21], described in details
in Appendix A. As a result, all the voltages are assumed
to be at 1 p.u and the angle differences are assumed to
be very small. Thus, the amount of power flowing through
each link is approximately inversely proportional to the
impedances. We calculate the ’Maximum power paths’
for each node and describe the algorithm for the same
in Appendix B. Maximum power paths are those which
provide the maximum amount of power from a generator
to a given node as compared to all other alternate paths
from different generators. The generation and the load are
assumed to be equal at all times. Thus, a reduction in load
would automatically mean a reduction in the generation.
We also make an assumption that the system is at the
limit of the maximum load and so the failure of a single
component may lead to a cascade of overloading failures.
To analyze the effect of topology of the power grid
networks on cascading failures, we used the IEEE 300
bus [22], IEEE 118 bus [22], and WSCC 179 bus networks.
To explain the power grid as a complex network, the buses
are referred to as nodes and the transmission lines as links.
Since we consider the DC Power Flow model, we assume
that the resistances are very small as compared to the
inductances and hence the impedances of the transmission
lines are simply reactances. The 300 node network consists
of 247 nodes plus two smaller subsections of nodes which
are not very well connected with the main graph. These two
subsections were not critical for analyzing the power grid
from a topological point of view and thus they were not
included in the analysis. Therefore, the 300 node network
will be referred to as 247 node network here onwards
unless we refer to the standard test case. An important
attribute to be considered is the capacity of nodes and
links. The nodes are characterized by a finite load. The
capacity of a node is the maximum load it can handle [10].
The capacity of a link is the maximum power that it
can carry between two nodes. In the case of linearized
model, the capacity of a link is primarily governed by
the line impedances which depend upon the electrical
characteristics of the transmission lines such as length. The
amount of power flowing through a line can be calculated
using the following relation:
Pij =
δi − δj
Xij
(1)
where, Pij is the power flow between nodes i and j, δi
and δj are the angles of the voltages at nodes i and j,
and Xij is the impedance of the link between them. The
angle difference is usually very small. Thus, higher the
impedance, lower the capacity.
The simulator uses an adjacency matrix X to represent the
interconnections in the network. When a link exists be-
tween nodes i and j, the corresponding entry xij is a non-
zero number and the entry is zero if there is no link present.
The non-zero entry in X represents the impedances of
the transmission lines. We collected the available load
information from the test cases [22] and populated it in
a vector called the LoadVector. This vector has a value 0
if there is no load on the node and a real number if the
node carries a load. Nodes can be generators/sources, nodes
with no loads, or the load carrying nodes. By Kirchoff’s
Junction Law, the algebraic sum of incoming power and
outgoing power should be zero. Hence, the amount of
power that goes into the node should be equal to the sum
of the power that is consumed and transmitted further.
We assume a lossless situation and therefore no power is
dissipated as heat or other losses. As previously mentioned,
the total generation is equal to the total load.
We categorized the links into two types - vulnerable and
non-vulnerable - depending upon whether they caused
more or less than ten percent damage to the network upon
removal. Damage indicates both, the loss in connectivity
and the loss of load. At steady state, approximately 41.97%
of the links in the 247 nodes IEEE test network are
vulnerable and the remaining 58.03% are non-vulnerable
links. We first calculate the power flowing through each
link using the equation above. Then, we select one of the
links from the list of vulnerable links and remove it from
the network to study the cascading effect. As a result of
this removal, the power carried by this link is redistributed
among its neighboring links. All the angles and power
flows are recomputed by the method described in Appendix
A. After the initial failure, the power grid goes through
multiple stages of failures before it finally stabilizes. Each
stage of cascade is called an iteration. We record the
number of links and nodes that fail in each iteration as
a result of the failures in the previous iteration and the
consequent redistribution. We use Power Degradation as a
measure to quantify the severity of the damage in terms
of load loss. Power Degradation is the current load on the
system. In other words, it is the difference between the
original load on the system and the load lost in the current
iteration. Power degradation is observed at each iteration
and the power degradation graph as shown in Fig. 5 is
generated. We consider worst case analysis, which means
the analysis of the system by removal of a link which
causes the maximum damage to the system. Analysis of
the graph is done in the following section.
III. IMPACT OF TOPOLOGY ON THE ROBUSTNESS OF
POWER GRID NETWORK
The topology of a network determines the arrangement
of nodes in the network and how they are connected to
each other. A small change in the network topology such
as removal or addition of nodes and/or links may lead to
changes in the network properties. This, in turn, may affect
the robustness of the network. The aim of this section is
not to suggest alternate topologies for a power grid but
simply to show that a change in topology can make the
power grid more robust to failures and attacks.
Since power grids are critical infrastructure, the data of
power grid networks is not readily available, except for
the few test cases available at the online archive of Wash-
ington University [22]. Thus, for a topological comparison,
there was a need to generate other topologies which were
similar to realistic power grid models but had different
arrangement of nodes and links. We keep the number of
nodes and links the same as the corresponding test case
but connect the links differently as compared to the test
case. Since the number of nodes and links of the generated
networks is the same as that of the test cases, the average
node degree is also the same because average node degree
is given by:
< k >=
2E
N
(2)
where E is the number of links and N is the number of
nodes.
In addition, since the generated networks should be as
close to realistic networks as possible, we also match the
maximum node degree of the generated networks with the
corresponding test networks. Since the degree distribution
is not kept fixed, we call these generated networks as first
approximation networks. We generate about 20 such first
approximation networks, out of which 5 are shown in Fig.
1, Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 for the 247, 179 and 118 node networks
respectively.
Fig. 1. 247 Nodes Original (first) and Generated Networks
Fig. 2. 179 Nodes Original (first) and Generated Networks
Fig. 3. 118 Nodes Original (first) and Generated Networks
A. Comparison with the Generalized Model for Random
Graphs
The Erdos-Renyi model [23] and the network genera-
tion algorithm of Molloy and Reed [24] are the simplest
network models to include stochasticity as an essential
element in the construction of the network. The connection
of links in these two models is completely random and lack
knowledge of the principles that guide the creation of links
between nodes. Thus, links in these models are created
randomly with a given connection probability p. Another
model for creation of random graphs is the Generalized
Random Graph model [25], [26], [27] which still keeps
the assignment of links random but the difference is
that it specifies a predefined degree sequence. Thus, the
Generalized model can produce graphs with degree distri-
butions which are not necessarily Poisson. The Generalized
Random Graph model was first proposed in 1978 in [28]
and is also known as the Configuration model. This model
generates networks with a given degree distribution. It is
specified in terms of a degree sequence, for example, for a
network with N nodes, there is a fixed degree sequence ki,
for i = 1toN , such that the ith node has degree ki. Then
two elements are randomly picked from this sequence and
the nodes corresponding to those entries are connected.
Thus, these graphs are completely random but with an
imposed degree distribution. Our model falls in between
the Erdos-Renyi model and the Generalized model but can
be considered as a variation of the Generalized model.
We impose certain constraints on the connection of links
but do not impose a degree distribution. The constraints
come in the form of specifying the desired average degree
and the desired maximum degree of the network under
construction. This is because the real power grid networks
cannot have very high degrees and the average degree is
usually between 2.5 to 3.5. Although real world power
grid networks cannot be modeled as random networks, as
mentioned in sections above, the purpose of this paper
is simply to show that topological changes play a role
in affecting the robustness of the network. If a set of
additional geographical, voltage and other constraints are
given, it is possible to create different feasible topologies
using this set of constraints, with different degrees of
robustness.
B. Analysis of the generated networks and comparison of
their robustness with the test cases
The generated random graphs closely follow the node
degree distribution of the respective test case network,
although it is not imposed. Fig. 1, 2, and 3 show the test
network and five out of the family of generated networks
for the 247 node, the 179 node, and the 118 node systems,
respectively. Fig. 4 shows the node degree distributions of
the 247 node test and generated networks. The horizontal
scale represents the degree from 1 to the maximum node
degree for the networks (8 in this case), and the vertical
axis represents the number of nodes with a given node
degree. The generator takes the number of nodes, the
maximum node degree, and the average node degree as
inputs and gives the adjacency list of the network as the
output. The adjacency list contains pairs of nodes that
every link connects. Cascading failure is then simulated
on these networks. We generate the impedances and loads
probabilistically from the impedance and load distributions
measured from the test networks. The adjacency matrix
is created by random connection of nodes, taking into
account that none of the nodes exceed the maximum
node degree and there are no self loops or multiple edges
between any two nodes in the system. Fig. 5 shows the
Fig. 4. Node Degree Distribution of the 247 Nodes Original and
Generated Networks
graphs for power degradation on the 247 test and five
generated networks. The horizontal scale represents the
iterations that the system goes through before it finally
stabilizes and the vertical scale is the current load on the
system in MW. The generated networks have an average
of 72.56MW of load remaining at stability but for the test
network, less than 5MW remains. The original load on
the system is 235.04MW. Each of the generated networks
performs better than the test network but their behaviors
differ from each other because each of them has a different
topology and the efficiency of redistribution of power
after the initial failure is different for different topologies.
Table I shows the comparison between different topological
characteristics of the test and the generated networks.
Fig. 5. Power Degradation Graphs for the 247 Nodes Original and
Generated Networks
The table discusses three network metrics: Characteristic
Nodes Network Path Length Diam Cluster Coeff
Test 9.646 24 0.102
G1 5.162 10 0.0
G2 5.191 11 0.008
247 G3 5.263 13 0.016
G4 5.190 11 0.006
G5 5.300 12 0.001
Test 12.382 34 0.089
G1 5.968 14 0.012
G2 6.058 15 0.0
179 G3 5.661 13 0.012
G4 5.683 13 0.004
G5 5.616 12 0.001
Test 6.309 9 0.165
G1 4.223 9 0.032
G2 4.259 9 0.008
118 G3 4.278 9 0.004
G4 4.348 9 0.004
G5 4.258 9 0.025
TABLE I
DIFFERENCES IN CHARACTERISTICS OF TEST AND GENERATED
NETWORKS
Path Length, Diameter, and Clustering Coefficient.
Characteristic Path Length is the average shortest distance
between all pair of nodes in the network. The shortest path
between any given pair of nodes i and j has been measured
in terms of number of links traversed by node i to reach
node j. The table indicates that the generated networks
have a shorter characteristic path length as compared to
the test networks. This is because random connections
can lead to short cuts in the network with a given node
connecting directly to a distant node. This makes the
generated networks better connected and hence contribute
to the improvement in robustness. Diameter is the longest
shortest path among the set of shortest paths for all pair of
nodes and is smaller for generated networks than that for
the test networks. Shorter characteristic path length and
shorter diameter ensure better global connectivity of the
network. The Clustering Coefficient is a measure of the
degree to which nodes in a graph tend to cluster. The local
Clustering Coefficient of a given node i is the degree to
which its neighbors are connected to each other. The value
of Clustering Coefficient shown in the table is the average
value for the network. The Clustering Coefficient of the
generated networks is much lower than that of the test
networks due to the more random nature of the graph in the
generated case. We are currently studying the contribution
of clustering coefficient to the robustness of a power grid
network and the drastic difference between the values for
the test and generated networks indicates that it must have
an effect on the robustness. From a purely topological
viewpoint, the generated networks are more robust than
the test networks because of better connectivity.
IV. MITIGATION STRATEGIES
In the past, some researchers have analyzed different
mitigation strategies for blackouts in power grids. The
authors of [29] have mentioned that their findings suggest,
counter intuitively, that sometimes sensible attempts to
mitigate failures in complex systems like power grids can
have adverse effects and therefore must be approached with
care. The authors have considered three types of mitigation
measures and evaluated their impact on the frequency of
large and small size blackouts. They suggest that mitigation
measures, such as reducing the probability that an over-
loaded line suffers an outage, requiring a certain minimum
number of lines to get overloaded before an outage occurs
or increasing the generation margin shifts the dynamic
equilibrium of the system and brings it to a point of self-
organized criticality, reducing the risk of large blackouts.
Similar analysis has been carried out in [7]. However, [30]
has two other methods of mitigating cascading failures,
namely survivability and reciprocal altruism. Other than
these newly proposed strategies, load shedding has been
a classical and a quite reliable mitigation strategy. We
propose the following three mitigation strategies, two of
them based on load shedding, to limit the damage to
the network by cascading failures: Homogeneous Load
Reduction, Targeted Load Reduction and Islanding with
distributed sources. Each of these strategies is discussed in
detail.
A. Homogeneous Load Reduction
This mitigation strategy aims at reducing a given per-
centage of the load on each of the nodes in the network.
This reduction in load attempts to keep the nodes and links
operating below their maximum capacities and to better
accommodate the redistribution of power due to failure
of links or nodes. We perform a series of simulations
on the test 247 node network, wherein the load on each
of the nodes is reduced from zero percent to hundred
percent, in steps of five. Thus, the starting load for each
simulation is the initial load on the nodes. We plot the
result of each simulation for the test 247 node network to
obtain the Homogeneous Load Reduction curve as shown
in the Fig. 6. Each point on the horizontal axis corresponds
to one of the values of percentage reduction between
zero and hundred. The graph represents the final result
of the simulations corresponding to each point on the
horizontal axis. About 10% reduction on each of the nodes
of the network leads to the emergence of a connected
subgraph that contains the majority of the entire graph’s
nodes. However, the complete protection of the network
takes place at 80% load reduction, shown by the dotted
line. Complete protection of the network means there is
complete connectivity in the network or that all the nodes
of the network are saved from failure. Yet there will be
a very small amount of power degradation because of the
initial failure, which is the first link that failed. The failure
of the initial link does not necessarily lead to the failure
of nodes.
B. Targeted Load Reduction
The Homogeneous Load Reduction strategy is very
simple to implement because it requires the same amount
Fig. 6. Homogeneous Load Reduction Strategy on the 247 Original
network
of reduction for each of the nodes in the network. But
the drawback of this strategy is that load is reduced even
from the nodes which may not be affected by re-routing
of power to satisfy the demand. Thus, we propose a more
efficient strategy, the Targeted Load Reduction strategy.
The objective of this strategy is to reduce the load only
in a small portion of the network that will be affected due
to the re-routing caused by the initial failure. If we select
a node i from the network and follow it along its adjacent
nodes, considering the outgoing direction of power flow,
we discover a tree, called the propagation tree, for node
i. Fig. 7 would be helpful in understanding the approach.
The approach used in this strategy is to select one of the
node connected to the link that failed, and discover the tree
for that node. It should be noted that out of the two nodes
connected to the failed link, the one which was receiving
power from that link should be used for tree discovery and
load reduction because this reduces the demand and hence
less re-routing is needed. The steps of the tree discovery
algorithm for the Targeted Load Reduction strategy are
listed below:
• Select a root node R.
• Select the nodes directly connected to R which re-
ceive power from R. These nodes are referred to as
first-level nodes. Find the neighbors of the first-level
nodes, other than R.
• Select only those neighbors, other than R, of these
first-level nodes that provide power to them.
• For all the selected neighbors of these first-level
nodes, including R, compare the magnitudes of the
power supplied by each of them. The node which
supplies highest power to a first-level node is on the
maximum power flow path of that first-level node.
A maximum power flow path is the path which
supplies the highest magnitude of power to a node
from a generator, as compared to all the other paths.
The back-tracing algorithm in Appendix B describes
the procedure to find the maximum power paths.
• If R is the node supplying maximum power to one
or more of the first-level nodes, that first-level node
becomes a part of the tree. Else that particular first-
level node is discarded.
• Now each of the first-level nodes selected in the tree
act as a root node individually to select next possible
candidates and the tree propagates.
• The tree stops when we reach a source node or a leaf
node. A leaf node is a node with degree one.
After discovering the tree, an equal percentage of load
is reduced on all the nodes of the tree except those nodes
which do not have any load or which are sources. The
analysis currently does not consider the priority of loads.
There are some loads which must be supplied with power
all the time and should not be considered for load reduction
even if they are a part of the tree. However, all nodes are
treated to be at the same priority in this work.
As shown in figure 7, node R is the initial root node. The
node R is connected to nodes 1, 2, and 3 referred to as
the first-level nodes. Now we find the neighbors of these
first-level nodes, other than R. Consider node 1 first. Node
1 has two other neighbors, A1 and B1.
In this case, the root node R and node B1 provide power
to node 1 but root node R supplies a higher magnitude of
power to node 1 than node B1 does. Therefore, R is on
the maximum power flow path from the generator to node
1. This means that node 1 will be directly affected by the
initial failure. Hence, node 1 forms a part of the tree and
would be used for load reduction. Similarly, we find if
node 2 and 3 form a part of the tree or not. The discovery
procedure continues with node 1 as the new root node.
Node 1 supplies power to node A1. In the next step, we
consider the other neighbors of node A1 and find out if
node 1 is the best supplier of power for node A1 or not.
If it is, then node A1 forms the next level of the tree and
the procedure continues for other nodes in a similar way.
There may be some nodes in the propagation tree which
may not carry any load but are simply used to transfer
power from one node to the other. We reduce the load
from the nodes in the tree, which carry load and are not
source nodes. The tree terminates when it reaches a source
node or a leaf node.
The discovered tree for a given link in the 247 node
test network is shown in Fig. 8 and more clearly in Fig.
9. The total number of nodes in the tree is 90 but load
is reduced on only 55 of these nodes. All the other nodes
have no load on them. The magnified circular and diamond-
shaped nodes form the tree, the diamond-shaped ones being
used for load reduction. The thicker links are part of the
tree and the broken link is shown dotted. Fig. 10 shows
the graph of load reduction on the tree for a given failed
link. A connected component with almost all the nodes is
observed at 40% reduction on the tree. The total protection
of the network is achieved at 80% reduction on the tree.
Fig. 7. Load Reduction on each of the diamond-shaped nodes in the
Tree - Targeted Load Reduction Strategy
Fig. 8. Tree view for the Targeted Mitigation Strategy
But this constitutes a very small portion of the total load
of the system, less than 2%. Fig. 11 shows the comparison
between the Homogeneous Load Reduction Strategy and
the Targeted Load Reduction strategy for the given link,
considering the entire network. The graph shows that the
Homogeneous Load Reduction strategy helps to protect a
major portion of the network at about 20% load reduction.
But the Targeted Load Reduction is more efficient because
only about 0.35% reduction on a small subset of the
network is enough to get the same or better results as those
obtained from the Homogeneous Load Reduction strategy,
as shown in the inset.
Considering all the links in the network, the average
size of the tree is x nodes, with reduction happening
on an average of y nodes. The average reduction on the
overall network is about z%, to protect the network from
a cascading failure.
C. Distributed Generation and Islanding
Distributed generation includes the application of small
generators scattered throughout a power system to provide
for the electric power needed by the consumers [31].
In general, the term distributed generation refers to all
the small electric power generators which are located on
the utility system, at the site of a consumer. However,
in this work, we deal with distributed generation at the
Fig. 9. Targeted Mitigation Strategy showing only the tree and the
disconnected link
Fig. 10. Targeted Mitigation Strategy - Load Reduction on the Tree
transmission side to enable islanding of the transmission
grid in the event of critical faults which may lead to a
cascading failure.
There are several partitioning algorithms discussed in
literature for partitioning a network into ”communities” or
groups of nodes within which the connections are dense
and between which they are sparse [32]. Some of the graph
partitioning computer algorithms are discussed in [33].
However, as mentioned in [32], these algorithms are not
ideally suited to general network analysis because they
Fig. 11. Homogeneous Load Reduction and Targeted Load Reduction
on the network. Inset: Targeted Load Reduction on the network
typically divide the network into two parts instead of a
general number of communities and typically work for un-
weighted networks. An algorithm for community structure
discovery in unweighted networks was proposed in [34] to
avoid the mentioned drawbacks of other algorithms. The
same authors proposed a measure called ”modularity”, to
evaluate the network partitions. Modularity is a quality
function that determines the quality of the partitions on
the scale of 0 to 1, with 1 being the highest value.
In this work, we create islands in the power grid
network using a two-step process, followed by load
shedding, if required. The first step gives a ba-
sic partitioning of the network using modularity [32],
[35], [36], [37], [38], [39], [40], [41], [42], [43], [44]. The
formula for modularity in weighted networks, as analyzed
in [32], [41] and others is
Q =
1
2w
∑
i
∑
j
(wij − wiwj
2w
)δ(Ci, Cj) (3)
where wij is the weight on the link between node i and
node j (0 if no link exists)
wi is the total weight on node i
wi =
∑
j
wij (4)
w is the sum of the weights on all the links of the network
2w =
∑
i
wi =
∑
i
∑
j
wij (5)
Ci is the community to which node i is assigned
and the Kronecker delta function δ(Ci, Cj) is 1 if nodes i
and j belong to the same community which means when
Ci = Cj , else it is 0.
The weights in this equation are replaced by power flows
and the equation is modified as:
Q =
1
Λ
∑
i
∑
j
(Pij − PiPj
Λ
)δ(Ti, Tj) (6)
where Pij is the power in the link between node i and
node j
Pi is the total load on node i
Pi =
∑
j
Pij (7)
Λ is the total load in the power grid network
Λ =
∑
i
Pi =
∑
i
∑
j
Pij (8)
Ti is the island to which node i is assigned
and the Kronecker delta function has a similar role as in
the above definition of modularity.
This technique places low power flow links between
islands and these links can then be disconnected without
causing much damage to the network. The drawback of this
technique is that it considers all nodes to be equal and does
not distinguish between the distributed sources and other
nodes. As a result, if the sources are not distributed evenly
in space, one or more islands obtained using modularity
may not have any generation. Thus, it is important to have
a uniform spatial distribution of sources to obtain a good
islanding scheme. However, if sources are not uniformly
distributed, the drawback can be overcome by applying the
second step of the process, which is called ’Superisland-
ing’. Superislanding means combining two or more islands
such that the demand and supply within the superisland
can be balanced with minimum load shedding. After the
initial islanding, we convert the network to an aggregated
network, with each island representing a single node in
the system. Thus, the number of nodes in the aggregated
network is equal to the number of islands obtained by
modularity. We then create the adjacency matrix of the
aggregated network for which the entry of the matrix is
1 if the islands are connected and 0 if they are not. The
actual and aggregated network for the 247 node system is
shown in Fig. 12 and Fig. 13 respectively. All nodes in the
aggregated network have load while some nodes also have
generation. The nodes with a ’+’ have more generation than
required, and the nodes with a ’-’ have less generation than
required, to fulfill the demand in that island. If a particular
island has enough generation to satisfy its load, that island
is not considered for superislanding.
Fig. 12. Islands in the 247 node network - Each color represents a
different island with the big nodes being the sources. The biggest node
is the main generator
The following algorithm describes the process of su-
perislanding:
1) Superislanding:
1) Assumptions:
a) The generation and the load are completely bal-
anced in the initial system. In other words, total
load in the system is equal to total generation.
b) No losses in the transmission line are consid-
ered.
c) Only those islands which have an imbalance in
Fig. 13. Aggregated network - Each island is represented as a single
node. The islands with a ’+’ have excess generation while those with a
’-’ have less generation
generation and load are considered for superis-
landing.
2) Algorithm:
a) Check if island i and j are connected,
A(i, j) == 1, and both are marked for superis-
landing.
b) Do a pairwise comparison of generation and
load over all such connected pairs of nodes in
the aggregated network:
Pg(i, j) = Pg(i) + Pg(j)
Pl(i, j) = Pl(i) + Pl(j)
net(i, j) = Pg(i, j)− Pl(i, j)
where, Pg(i) is the individual generation of is-
land i, Pg(i, j) is the total generation of islands
i and j, Pl(i) is the load of island i, Pl(i, j) is
the total load of islands i and j, and net(i, j)
is the net generation of the combination. In
case there are multiple combinations possible
for a given island, we select the combination
which gives the most positive net(i, j) among
the possible combinations of i and j.
c) The following cases are considered for group-
ing islands:
Case1 : Island i has an excessive generation
and island j does not have any generation.
The most ideal case is that this combination
does not make net(i, j) negative, which means
the total load does not exceed the total genera-
tion after combination. If net(i, j) < 0 but total
load exceeds the total generation by less than
or equal to 5%, excessive load is shed from j
and the combination is allowed.
Case2 : If i has excess generation and j has a
source but less generation. Again, the combina-
tion should not cause the condition net(i, j) <
0 and if it happens the difference should be less
than or equal to 5% to allow superislanding.
Case3 : If none of the above cases occur, load
shedding is carried out for the island which
has load imbalance. This makes the load and
generation balanced and this island is no longer
considered for superislanding.
d) After all possible combinations, go back to step
two and repeat the process until no further
combinations are possible.
V. RESULTS
The following results were obtained from the discussions
above:
• The power degradation graphs in Fig. 5 show that
the worst-case cascading effect stops at an earlier
stage and causes less damage in the case of generated
networks. The load loss in the best topology of the
247 node generated network discussed above is about
36.79% less than the test network.
• As seen from Table I, the generated graphs have
a smaller characteristic path length and diameter as
compared to the real networks. This property of the
generated network topology makes them more robust
against cascading failures. However, the clustering
coefficient of the generated networks is much lower
than that of the test networks, due to more random
nature of the generated networks and its contribution
to robustness must be analyzed.
• Targeted Load Reduction strategies form a special
case of the Homogeneous Load Reduction strategy.
The Homogeneous Strategy is easier to implement,
in that we simply reduce the load on all the nodes
existing in the network. The Targeted Load Reduction
strategy is more economical, and reduces the load
reduction to x% as compared to the Homogeneous
strategy, for an average of y% network protection.
Formation of islands depends on the distribution of
sources in the network. If the sources have an even
spatial distribution, a good islanding scheme can be
obtained. However, if the distribution of sources is not
uniform, it leads to the formation of superislands.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The topology of the power grid network contributes to
its robustness. The topology determines the connectivity of
the network and hence the number of alternate paths that
can be taken by the network flow. The generated graphs
are better connected because of shorter characteristic path
lengths and are more random in nature than the real power
grid networks. However, real power grid networks cannot
be modeled in this way. Thus, if a set of geographical,
voltage and other practical constraints is given, feasible
power grid topologies can be created with different levels
of vulnerability.
The Homogeneous Load Reduction strategy is similar
to the classical mitigation strategies of load shedding and
is simple to implement. The Targeted strategy is more
efficient since the load is reduced on a very small subset
of nodes and corresponds to a very small load reduction
on the entire network.
Islanding incorporates the use of distributed renewable
sources and helps to reduce the stress on the main grid
by separating components from it without causing much
damage and also ensures that the disconnected components
are continuously powered without much loss of load.
Our future work includes the following:
• Designing more feasible topologies taking into ac-
count geographical co-ordinates,
• Study the impact of clustering coefficient on the
robustness of the power grid network, and
• Thorough fault analysis with islanding and distributed
sources
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APPENDIX
The DC Power Flow model has been used for analysis
of the topological features of the power grid network. For
the DC model, we regard the branch resistances to be very
small as compared to the inductive reactances and hence
the resistances have been neglected. The shunt admittances
have been neglected too. The line inductances govern the
amount of power that flows through the links. The optimal
path for power flow is the one that offers least impedance
from a generator to a node or in other words, delivers the
maximum power to a node from the generator. Node 1 is
considered as the reference node.
A. DC Power Flow Model
We cannot use metrics such as number of hops or short-
est distance to find the efficient path from the generator to
the destination node in case of a power grid. This inability
to use such metrics arises from the fact that the amount of
power flowing through a link depends upon the impedance
of the link.
The map of the power grid in the form of nodes and links
is used to create a weighted adjacency matrix X . When
nodes i and j are connected, xij is a positive non-zero entry
and it is zero otherwise. These entries are the inductances
of the transmission lines. A matrix b is created from the
adjacency matrix using the following formula [21]:
bij =
−1
xij
,∀i 6= j (9)
bii =
N∑
j=1
−bij (10)
The power handled by each node is the total load
incident on the node. This is true because of the assumption
that the total power going into the node is equal to the total
power coming out of it.
Power in each link must be calculated as follows:
Pij = −bijδij = δi − δj
Xij
,where δij = δi - δj (11)
The power at each node can be calculated as:
Pi =
N∑
i=1,j∈n(i)
Pij =
N∑
i=1,j∈n(i)
−bijδij (12)
where n(i) = set of neighbors of i
The phase angles, δ, are calculated for each node using
the inverted b matrix and a load vector P . This load vector
is the load information that is given in the data sheet
provided for the test networks.
δ = b−1P (13)
We usually have the system ground is the reference bus
in real power systems. The reference bus has the phase
angle of 0 deg and all other angles are measured with
respect to this angle [21]. However, since we drop all shunt
admittances for simplification, we lose the reference. This
means that the b matrix obtained from one of the above
equation will be a singular matrix. We cannot calculate the
inverse of the b matrix if it is singular. To overcome this,
one of the buses is assigned as the reference bus and the
row and column corresponding to this reference bus in {b}
are dropped to produce a non-singular {b} and its inverse
is calculated. Following the real world system, we assign
one of the generator nodes as the reference node and drop
the row and column corresponding to it to produce a non-
singular {b}.
B. Back-Tracing Algorithm to find the Maximum Power
Paths
The steps of the algorithm are described below. The
algorithm back traces the path from a destination node to a
generator. This path carries the maximum amount of power
to the destination node out of all the paths that the node
can trace back to other generators.
1) Search for the neighbors of the selected destination
node from the adjacency matrix. A given node is a
neighbor if
bij 6= 0,∀j 6= i (14)
2) Assume outgoing power to be positive and incoming
power to be negative. Select the neighboring nodes
which supply power to the destination node. In other
words, the nodes providing power to the destination
node are candidate previous nodes in the optimal
path.
Pij < 0,∀j 6= i⇒ (15)
j is a possible candidate for the previous node in
the path
3) Compare the magnitudes of link power between the
destination node and each candidate previous node
and select the one with the highest magnitude.
|Pij | > |Pik| ⇒ (16)
previous node = j
Else previous node = k where j, k ∈ neighbors of i
4) Now the previous node becomes the destination node
and the same back tracing procedure is applied to
search for its previous node and so on till we reach
a generator.
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